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Abstract 
This paper investigates issues related to the Burgstahler and Dichev methodology (1997) applied to test earnings 
management (EM) in Islamic banking institutions (IBIs) using earnings measured over alternative periods. These 
alternative periods are periods ending at the first three quarters of the fiscal year. We compare the statistical 
properties of  fiscal year earnings to annual earnings starting with the fiscal year quarters two, three and four. In 
general, our results for the higher moments of  the earnings distribution are more consistent with the EM 
hypothesis than with the settling up hypothesis. When the predictions of the two hypotheses differ, our results are 
generally more consistent with predictions resulting from the EM hypothesis. We  find evidence of higher degree 
of EM pervasiveness to avoid losses, consistent with a higher motivation to manipulate earnings. Such a 
motivation is affected by the way banks approach the zero earnings target. IBIs approaching the target from 
below show higher pervasiveness than IBIs approaching the target from above.  
Keywords: Earnings Management, Quarterly Earnings, Settling Up, Earnings Management Pervasiveness , 
Islamic Banking Institutions 
 
1. Introduction 
It is commonly tested whether companies are managing their earnings not to descend below significant 
thresholds (such as zero earnings or zero earnings increases) or to meet or beat analysts’ expectations. Faouzi and 
Zarai (2012) analyzed the distribution of net income and changes in that and provided conclusive evidence that 
Islamic banking institutions (IBIs) methodically avoid reporting losses. They document that the histogram of 
scaled net profit distributable has discontinuities around zero with a disproportionately low density in the interval 
immediately to the left of zero and a disproportionately high density in the interval which includes zero. They 
attribute these findings to earnings management (EM) by Islamic banks to meet earnings thresholds of zero 
earnings.  
Some previous studies question whether EM is responsible for the discontinuity around zero in the distribution 
of earnings and earnings changes. For example, Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson (2003) investigated whether 
special items and the asymmetric tax treatment of positive and negative earnings could be responsible for the 
observed discontinuity at zero in the distribution of earnings and earnings changes.  
 
Degeorge  and al. (1999) asserted that the results might be affected by deflating mechanism. They suggested that 
deflating disperses non-zero observations in the distribution while not dispersing observations that are exactly 
zero. They claimed that this contributes to the discontinuity at zero in the distribution of earnings and earnings 
changes (Jacob and Jorgensen, 2005). 
 
Likewise, Durtschi and Easton (2005) suggested that the discontinuity at zero in net income scaled by the market 
value of equity is a consequence of the deflating mechanism used and of selection biases. They asserted that 
deflating moves small loss companies away from zero while it moves small profit companies towards zero 
inducing the presence of a discontinuity at zero.  Durtschi and Easton (2005) also found that deflating by total 
assets or revenues induces similar biases as deflating by market value of equity. 
 
Based on the previous comments, we examine whether prior findings relative to earnings management behaviour 
in Islamic banks are indeed a consequence of the deflating procedures. We test the asymmetric effects of taxes on 
profit and loss. We also investigate the reasons for the higher volatility of fourth-quarter earnings. We attempt to 
distinguish between the “settling up” effect attributable to the integral approach to quarterly income and EM as 
reasons for this difference in volatility. Doing so, we will be able to shed some light on the debate over whether 
the observed discontinuities in the distribution of fiscal year earnings are attributable to EM or rather whether 
they are induced by the testing procedures used.  
 
We also address another issue that has confronted researchers investigating discontinuities in the histogram of 
accounting income, i.e., the degree of which EM are pervasive in Islamic banks. Moreira and Pope, (2007) 
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proposed measurement methodology is raised to analyze this construct. 
 
In this paper, we assume that managers are particularly concerned about fiscal year earnings reported in IBIs’ 
annual reports because many bonus and compensation schemes are based on earnings measured over this time 
period. These pay schemes provide incentives for managers to manipulate fiscal year income to maximize their 
compensation. Incentives to manage income are probably strongest in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year. At this 
time managers are likely to have a good sense of where they stand in relation to annual targets. Consistent with 
this, prior research provides evidence that the characteristics of fourth quarter earnings differ from earnings for 
the other three quarters (Jacob and Jorgensen, 2005). We treat the IBI’s choice of fiscal year as exogenous to our 
investigation. We do not view manager’s choice of fiscal year end as a strategic variable in the short-term. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section Tow describes our investigations into earnings management to meet 
thresholds. Section Three describes our tests to discriminate between earnings management and the “settling up” 
phenomenon. In Section Four, we analyze the pervasiveness of any EM. Finally, in Section Five, we state the 
main conclusions. 
 
2. Investigation Into Earnings Management To Meet Thresholds 
 
2.1. Test of Whether the Discontinuities are Induced by Scaling 
In this paragraph, we investigate issues related to the Burgstahler and Dichev methodology (1997) applied to test 
for earnings management in IBIs using earnings measured over alternative periods. These alternative periods are 
periods ending at the first three quarters of the fiscal year. The intuition underlying the use of these alternative 
periods is that earnings measured over these periods are less likely to suffer from the effects of managerial 
income manipulation than earnings measured over the fiscal year. Since managers are unlikely to be evaluated 
based on earnings for annual periods other than the fiscal year, they have less incentive to manage these earnings.  
In addition, if fiscal year earnings are managed through the use of accounting accruals in the fourth quarter and if 
some of these accruals reverse over subsequent quarters, these alternative annual earnings likely better represent 
the economic earnings for a year than the fiscal year earnings reported in annual financial statements. Using the 
histograms of our alternative estimates of annual earnings we examine whether the results indicating that IBIs 
manage their earnings are indeed a consequence of the scaling procedures used in prior papers (Jacob and 
Jorgensen, 2005). 
2.1.1. Sample Selection  
 
Our sample consists of an unbalanced panel of annual and unconsolidated report data from Islamic banks 
between 2000 and 2009. The sources of the bank and SSB data used for the empirical analysis are Islamic Banks 
and Financial Institutions Information System (IBIS)11 and our own research of the information presented on the 
web sites of Islamic banks in the sample to complete and to countercheck the selected data. Our analysis is thus 
based on a micro panel of annual supervisory bank-level data from 125 Islamic banks for the years 2000 through 
2009. Due to lack of data and mergers during the observed time period, the panel is unbalanced and consists of 
1242 bank-year observations. To be included in the sample, a bank must have income statement and balance 
sheet information for at least two consecutive years12.  
 
There are 137 Islamic banks in the original sample. We omitted 6 banks that have available data for only one 
year, 4 banks with missing data for at least one variable used in the later analysis, one bank without the needed 
consecutive information, and one bank without data for the study period. The final sample comprises 125 Islamic 
banks consisting 1242 bank-year observations, across 27 countries and for the fiscal years 2000 to 2009. In this 
paper, we investigate two earnings variables: the earnings change and the earnings level. For the earnings change 
study, there are 551 bank-year observations and for the earnings level study, there are 691 bank-year 
observations. 
 
2.1.2. Variables Measurement 
Similar to Faouzi and Zarai (2012), we define earnings levels as annual net distributable earnings to measure our 
                                                 
11This database is confectioned by Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI) and it is directed to "the community of 
researchers and finance professionals working in the area of Islamic economics and finance. It seeks to provide 
comprehensive data and information on the activities of Islamic finance institutions, up-to-date research and literature. It 
provides Islamic banks database along with tools for online analysis and download. It also features recent research activities 
conducted by IRTI.”  
12 since we scale earnings data by lagged assets 
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first threshold, which is avoiding losses. Annual net earnings changes are defined as net earnings in t minus net 
earnings in t-1 to measure our second threshold, which is avoiding earnings decreases. We deflate earnings levels 
and earnings changes by the bank's total assets (Mard, 2004) for the purpose of reducing the heteroscedasticity13 
problem. Hence, for every IBI and for every alternate period of the time period (2000–2009), we calculate the 
following ratios: 
 
2.1.3. Research Design on Earnings Management: Discontinuity in Distribution of Earnings 
 
Following Jacob and Jorgensen (2005), we examine the histograms of scaled earnings computed over alternate 
periods as a preliminary investigation of whether scaling is responsible for prior results. We thus construct 
histograms for earnings measured over alternate periods, periods ending in the first, second, and third quarters of 
the fiscal year. If prior results are due to some mechanical effect, such as the one induced by scaling, we are 
likely to observe similar patterns in the histograms of earnings for these other annual periods. If, on the other 
hand, the patterns we find are attributable to EM at fiscal year end, we must find the pattern of fiscal year 
earnings but not for the other three annual periods. 
To achieve this purpose, we first proceed by examining a graphical distribution of reported earnings around key 
earnings thresholds to observe discontinuities in the distribution. Second, following Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997), we compute the test statistics to demonstrate and test for discontinuities in the distribution. 
 
2.1.3.1. Graphical Evidence 
To test the existence of EM to avoid losses, we present graphical evidence in the form of histograms of the 
pooled cross-sectional empirical distributions of scaled earnings. EM to avoid losses is likely to be reflected in 
cross-sectional distributions of earnings in the form of unusually low frequencies of small losses and unusually 
high frequencies of small positive earnings. 
Positive values of earnings consist of the IBIs successfully avoiding losses and negative values consist of the 
banks reporting of losses. If managers are trying to avoid losses, we expect to observe an unusually large number 
of observations immediately to the right of zero and unusually few observations immediately to the left of zero. 
To examine the existence of EM to avoid earnings decrease we construct a historical histogram of the pooled 
cross-sectional empirical distributions of deflated earnings changes. The distributions of the change in earnings 
will not display a normal curve if the bank executives do EM in order to meet or exceed this threshold. More 
explicitly, if executives are trying to avoid decreases in earnings, we expect to observe an unusually large 
number of observations immediately to the right of zero, and unusually few observations immediately to the left 
of zero. 
 
EM to avoid decreases in earnings is likely to be reflected in pooled cross-sectional distributions of earnings in 
the form of abnormally low frequencies of small decreases in earnings and abnormally high frequencies of small 
increases in earnings. 
 
2.1.3.2. Statistical Test 
The statistical test consists of making the difference between the actual number of observations and the number 
of expected ones in an interval i (immediately to the right and to the left of zero) divided by the estimated 
standard deviation of this difference. Specifically, the statistical test, as developed by Burgstahler and Dichev 




• AQi: the actual number of observations falling in interval i, 
• EQi: the expected number of observations in interval i. In particular, EQi = (AQi-1 + AQi+1)/2. 
•  SDi: the estimated standard deviation of the difference between the actual and expected numbers of 
observations around interval i14. In particular,  
                                                 
13 In this frame, several approaches were used in the relative accounting and financial literature. Note, for instance, the 
market value, the accounting value and sales or total assets (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997).  
14 They further gave the variance estimation in the footnote six: 
“Since the number of observations in an interval is a random variable which is approximately independent of the number in 
adjacent intervals, the variance of the difference between the observed and expected number of observations is 
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SDi = [Npi(1 - pi) + (1/4)N(pi_1 + pi+1)(1 - pi_1 -pi+1)]1/2, 
Where, 
 N is the total number of observations in the sample;  
 pi is the proportion of the actual number of observations for interval i to the bank-periods; 
namely pi = AQi/N; 
 pi-1=  AQi-1/N  
  pi+1 = AQi+1/N. 
The assessment of the significance of these statistics is performed against 1.645. The values of DS, which are 
equal or superior in absolute value to 1.645, show the evidence of EM to achieve thresholds. This number 
corresponds to a level of significance of 5% for a standardized normal distribution (Brown and Caylor, 2005). 
Based on the works of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) as well as those of Brown and Caylor (2003), we consider 
a threshold with highly negative values of DS as being evidence of the existence of a more important EM. 
 
2.1.4. Results  
 
Figure.1 depicts the histograms of annual and alternate period's earnings deflated by beginning total assets. The 
discontinuity around zero is visually apparent for fiscal year earnings but not for earnings computed for the 
alternate periods.  
[Insert Figure.1] 
Table.1 presents results for the tow intervals around zero for levels of scaled earnings. For each of the intervals, 
we present results for the four periods, i.e., for periods ending at the first , second , third and fourth quarters. The 
last annual period, ending in the fourth quarter, corresponds to the fiscal year. For each period, the table displays 
SDI-statistic for the statistical significance of the deviancy of the actual frequency from the expected frequency. 
[Insert Table.1] 
The results presented in Table.1 confirm prior findings for fiscal year annual earnings around zero. The 
frequency in the interval immediately to the left of zero is significantly lower than expected and the frequency in 
the interval to the right of zero is significantly higher than expected. The SDI-statistics corresponding to these 
intervals are strongly significant, statistically (p = 0.001, and p = 0.01 respectively). According to the EDA, this 
is consistent with management of annual earnings to avoid reporting losses. 
 
However, we find that periodic earnings computed using the interim alternate periods do not share these 
characteristics (excepting, to some extent, for the alternate period ending in the third quarter). We conjecture that 
the reason we observe results for the annual period ending in the third quarter similar but weaker than those for 
fiscal year earnings is that there is indication that IBIs also can manage third quarterly earnings to achieve 
thresholds (DeGeorge et al.,1999). This phenomenon would render the patterns induced by EM to meet fiscal-
year targets less distinct. The magnitude of the discontinuity around zero is considerably higher for fiscal year 
earnings than for any of the other three alternate periods. These results do not support DeGeorge et al. (1999) 
and Durtschi and Easton (2005)’s argument that scaling induces the results that Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
report in the area of zero in the histogram of scaled earnings. 
 
If  EM is more prevalent at fiscal year-end than at the end of other alternate periods, the histogram of fiscal year 
earnings might be less smooth, i.e., have more discontinuities than the histogram of earnings for the other 
periods. We investigate this assumption by calculating the average of the absolute values of the SDI-statistics for 
the intervals of the histograms of earnings distinctly for each period.  Consistent with this hypothesis, we find 
that the average SDI-statistic is significantly higher for the histogram of fiscal year earnings than for any of the 
other alternate periods (excepting, once more for the alternate period ending in third quarter). The average SDI-
statistic is 0.877 for periods ending in the first quarter, 0.773 for periods ending in the second quarter, 1.025 for 
periods ending in third quarter and 0.914 for the fiscal year earnings.  
The results of a similar analysis for changes in net income are presented in Table.2. 
[Insert Table.2] 
The results do not support the EM hypothesis for fiscal year scaled earnings changes. However, somewhat 
surprisingly, earnings computed for the other alternate periods appear to share this property, although to a lesser 
extent. The deviation from the expected frequency in the first interval immediately to the left of zero is negative 
                                                                                                                                                        
approximately the sum of the variances of the components of the difference. Denoting the total number of observations as N 
and probability that an observation will fall into interval i by pi, the variance of the difference between the observed and 
expected number of observations for interval i is approximately Npi(1-pi) + (1/4)N(pi-1+ pi+1)(1- pi-1– pi+1).” 
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and this deviation in interval 0 is positive for all four annual periods. We suppose that the reason we observe this 
phenomenon is that the distribution of earnings changes has a natural peak directly to the right of zero. Changes 
in earnings tend thus to be slightly positive. This is obvious from the histograms for changes in earnings deflated 
by total assets of equity for all four periods presented in figure.2 
[Insert Figure.2] 
The results shown in Tables.1 and 2 would seem to argue against scaling being primarily responsible for the 
detected discontinuities. The discontinuities at zero, when present, in the distribution of our alternate annual 
earnings measures, scaled similarly to fiscal year earnings, are much smaller in magnitude and usually not 
statistically significant. The results are very similar to those reported in Faouzi an Zarai (2012),  where the 
earning is scaled by Islamic bank total assets. Overall, the results reported in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that the 
discontinuity at zero in the distribution of scaled earning is not due to the scaling mechanism and is very likely 
related to EM to attain earnings thresholds. 
 
2.2. Test of Whether the Discontinuity is Due to the Asymmetric Tax Treatment of Profits and Losses 
 
Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2003) suggested that because of restrictions on tax refunds for loss firms, the 
taxes related with profits are proportionally higher than the tax savings related with losses. Small profits are thus 
taxed in a different way than small losses. They claimed that this asymmetric tax treatment can explicate a 
considerable proportion of the discontinuity at zero in scaled net income. If a substantial portion of the 
discontinuity of net income is attributable to tax effects, the discontinuity at zero in pre-tax income should be 
noticeably smaller. Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2003) tested this assertion for pre-tax income scaled by 
market value of equity at the beginning of the year and found that the magnitude of the discontinuity is 
significantly reduced compared with the discontinuity in similarly scaled net income. In this section , we carried 
out the same analysis on scaled profit before taxes and zakat scaled by total assets (hereafter pre-tax earnings or 
pre-tax earnings respectively changes). 
Figure.3 displays the histograms of pre-tax earnings and pre-tax earnings changes respectively for the fiscal year 
annual period.  
[Insert Figure.3] 
The results, presented in Table.3, are very similar to those for scaled earnings. Again, the actual frequency in the 
first interval immediately to the left of zero is significantly lower than expected (SDI = - 3.21) and the actual 
frequency in the first interval immediately to the right of zero is significantly higher than expected (SDI = 2.32). 
It is clear that a substantial proportion of the discontinuity at zero in the histogram of scaled earnings is also 
present in the histogram of pre-tax income. These results seem to indicate that the asymmetric tax treatment of 
gains and losses is not primarily responsible for the discontinuity at zero in scaled earnings.  
[Insert Table.3] 
 
For changes in pre-tax scaled earnings, matching the previous year’s pre-tax income may not be important to 
Islamic bank executives. The results are not significant as for zero scaled earning thresholds. In fact, the 
frequency of observations for fiscal year pre-tax earnings in the first interval immediately to the right of zero is 
significantly higher than expected (SDI= 0.35; <1.645). Moreover, the deviation of actual from the expected 
frequency in the first interval immediately to the left of zero is not significantly different from zero (SDI = -
1.049 ; <1.645). While we cannot exclude the possibility that the asymmetric tax treatment of gains and losses 
contributes to the discontinuity at zero in the histogram of scaled earnings changes, it seems that this 
phenomenon is not principally responsible for the phenomena documented the EDA we use in this chapter. 
  
Brief our findings appear to support Faouzi and Zarai (2012) findings that the discontinuities in earnings and 
earnings change distributions are symptomatic of EM. It does not appear that distortions or selection biases 
introduced by the asymmetric tax treatment of gains and losses wholly explain our findings.  
 
3. Discrimination Between Earnings Manangement And The “Settling Up” Phenomenon 
Collins, Hopwood, and McKeown (1984), among others, documented that fourth-quarter earnings are more 
volatile than interim quarter earnings. They attributed this increased volatility to several sources, namely: 
• The larger occurrence of write-offs and asset sales in the fourth quarter (Bartov, 1993).  
• Under the integral approach to accounting, quarterly earnings are presumed to be an integral part of 
annual earnings and consequently fourth quarter earnings are used to reconcile or “settle up” annual 
earnings with the sum of quarterly earnings in the former three quarters. Under this approach, any 
estimation errors in the preceding three quarters are adjusted through fourth quarter earnings – a method 
which could make fourth quarter earnings more volatile.  
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• Fourth quarter earnings are more volatile because of EM practices (Oyer, 1998). 
Other studies study earnings response coefficients (ERCs) associated with earnings from different quarters. 
Differences in ERCs between the fourth and other quarters could have numerous causes. First, annual earnings 
are audited while interim earnings are merely reviewed. Second, for seasonal companies, the fourth quarter often 
has the maximum revenue and consequently the most influential in determining annual income. Third, the 
"settling up" effect defined in the prior paragraph causes the fourth quarter earnings to be volatile. For instance, 
firms using intermittent LIFO for inventory use estimates to compute interim earnings. This could induce greater 
volatility in the fourth quarter’ earnings when rectifications are made. Finally, EM in the fourth quarter could 
cause earnings for this quarter to be more volatile and less helpful. The first explanation would expect higher 
ERCs for the fourth-quarter earnings whereas the last two explanations predict lower ERCs. The majority of 
empirical evidence (Salamon and Stober, 1994) suggested that ERCs are lower for fourth quarter unpredicted 
earnings.  
Overall, there are conflicting explanations for the lower ERCs for the fiscal fourth-quarter earnings. One model 
suggests that the integral approach to interim earnings causes the fourth-quarter earnings to be more noisy than 
earnings for the other three quarters because the fourth quarter earnings are employed to ‘settle up’, or reconcile, 
the fiscal year earnings with the earnings of the previous three quarters. The earnings of the previous three 
quarters could use approximations and estimates that may need to be corrected in calculating annual earnings. 
Another possible justification is that the fourth quarter earnings encompass more noise because of EM at fiscal 
year-end.  
 
Lipe and Bernard (2000) hypothesized that if settling up causes noisy fourth quarter earnings then the fiscal year 
earnings should be less volatile than annual earnings measured over other quarters. They argued that this is 
because settling up corrects for errors in the earnings recorded in the first three quarters and renders the fiscal 
year earnings more precise and less noisy. They also predict that, if this is the case, volatility should gradually 
increase as we move to annual periods ending in the first, second, and third quarters as noise in earnings 
increases.  
 
If  the fourth quarter earnings are noisy because of EM through accruals manipulation and some of this accrual 
manipulation reverses over subsequent quarters, the expectations reverse. Fiscal year annual earnings would be 
anticipated to be the most volatile. The reversing accruals cause earnings measured over annual periods to 
become less volatile as we move to annual periods ending at quarter one and two. Volatility reaches its lowest 
level for the annual period ending in the third quarter when accruals have reversed to the highest extent.  
Jacob and Jorgensen (2005) validated Lipe and Bernard (2000)’s predictions for the higher moments of earnings, 
under both scenarios, using simulations. The simulation results confirm their intuition about the patterns that are 
induced by EM to meet fiscal year targets. Variance is highest for fiscal year earnings (earnings for the annual 
period ending at the fourth quarter). Also variance declines monotonically as we move from the fiscal year to 
annual periods ending at the end of the first, second, and third quarters. Skewness is lowest for fiscal year 
earnings and rises monotonically as we move to annual periods ending at the first, second, and third quarters. 
Kurtosis is highest for fiscal year earnings and lowest for annual earnings for the annual period ending at second 
quarter.  
 
They also simulate quarterly earnings under the ‘settling up’ premise. Again, consistent with the intuition, under 
the ‘settling up’ premise, variance is lowest for the annual period ending in quarter four. It increases 
monotonically and attains its peak for the period ending in third quarter. The skewness coefficient is lowest for 
the annual period ending in first quarter and is highest for the period ending in second quarter. The kurtosis 
coefficient is highest for fiscal year earnings and is lowest for the period ending in second quarter. The 
simulation results suggest that both the EM and the ‘settling up’ theories have similar expectations for kurtosis 
but very different expectations for the variance and skewness of annual earnings from the four annual periods. 
Table.4 below summarizes the behaviours of the three moments under the "Settling up" premise  and EM 
premise. 
[Insert Table.4] 
Following Lipe and Bernard (2000), we test our predictions using a pooled cross-sectional sample. We examine 
higher moments of annual earnings. Prior research documented that write-offs are more common in the fourth 
quarter (Elliot and Shaw, 1988). A possible manifestation of the big bath phenomenon, this could cause fiscal 
year earnings to be negatively skewed compared to earnings for other annual periods. We assume that some of 
the effects of the big bath reverse in following quarters and therefore the effects are not as obvious on the 
earnings of other annual earnings periods (Jacob and Jorgensen, 2005). We measure the skewness of Islamic 
banks’ annual earnings in each of the four ways to examine if fiscal year earnings are more negatively skewed.  
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Bartov (1993) found that over half of the sales of long-lived assets occur in the fourth quarter. Elliott and Shaw 
(1989) suggested that the majority of write-offs takes place in the fourth quarter. If Islamic banks manage 
earnings by taking write-offs and recognizing gains on asset sales in the fourth quarter, the distribution of 
earnings would have fatter tails in the fiscal year compared to other intermediate periods. We test for this by 
measuring the kurtosis, the fourth moment, of the distribution. Fatter tails would cause kurtosis to be higher. We 
measure the kurtosis coefficient of fiscal year earnings and compare it to the kurtosis coefficient of earnings 
measured over other quarterly periods.  
 
We investigate the statistical properties of the distribution of annual net income to see if they conform to the 
patterns under either of the hypotheses. We analyse the moments of net income. We investigate, in sequence, the 
higher moments, variance, skewness, and kurtosis corresponding to the second, third, and fourth central 
moments respectively. The results are reported in Table.5. 
[Insert Table.5] 
Our results for the variance, as reported in of Table.5, are more consistent with the EM hypothesis than the 
settling up hypothesis. The rank of the variance of fiscal year earnings is significantly higher than the rank for 
any of the other three intermediate periods. This result is more consistent with EM at the fiscal year-end than 
with effects induced by fourth quarter earnings being used to “settle up” the fiscal year earnings with the sum of 
the earnings for the previous three quarters. 
We carried out a comparable analysis for the skewness of the distribution of earnings. If executives take a big 
bath when unmanaged earnings are low, this will induce negative skewness in the distribution of earnings. This 
effect will lead to a lower rank of earnings skewness at the fiscal year end if some of the effects of the big bath 
reverse over succeeding quarters. The rank of the skewness coefficient for net income is most negative for the 
fiscal year. A greater number of large negative realizations of earnings appear in the fiscal year aggregation than 
in the other three quarters. The results of the other two skewness measures are similar. The distribution of annual 
earnings is most negatively skewed when fiscal year earnings are used15. This is consistent with executives 
taking large negative accruals in the fourth quarter which reverse, at least partially, in subsequent quarters. 
Finally, we analyse the fourth moment of earnings, kurtosis. We find that the kurtosis is larger at quarterly 
periods than at the reported fiscal year. Nevertheless, the kurtosis coefficient is highest for annual earnings for 
the period ending in quarter one. These results are therefore not strongly consistent with neither the settling up 
hypothesis nor EM through the big bath phenomenon or executives taking large positive accruals on occasion.  
 
Overall, our results for the higher moments of the earnings distribution are more consistent with the EM 
hypothesis than with the settling up hypothesis for the fourth quarter earnings. When the predictions of the two 
hypotheses differ, our results are generally more consistent with predictions resulting from the EM hypothesis. 
 
Collectively, the above tests generally validate prior findings (Faouzi and Zarai, 2012) and indicate that results 
are not spuriously made by scaling as Degeorge, et al. (1999). and Durtschi and Easton (2005) suggested. They 
also indicate that prior findings, for the most part, cannot be attributed to the asymmetric tax treatment of gains 
and losses. EM seems to be the most likely reason. Likewise, the findings of the discrimination between EM and 
‘settling up’ as the reasons for the lower ERCs of fourth fiscal quarter earnings are more consistent with the EM 
than with the ‘settling up’ hypothesis.  
 
4. Pervassiveness Of Earnings Management At The Thresholds 
 
In addition to investigating whether there is any EM at the threshold, we also analyse the pervasiveness of the 
EM. For Moreira and Pope (2007), the degree of pervasiveness is the proportion of the predicted number of 
companies undertaking EM in a given interval over the expected number of companies in this same interval in 
the pre-managed earnings distribution. In this section, pervasiveness refers to the percentage of Islamic banks in 
a sub-sample, at or around the threshold, that undertakes EM. 
 
In order to measure the pervasiveness of the EM, we have to compare the observed number of banks at some 
small interval to the left (and to the right) of zero in the presence of EM with the expected number of banks at 
the same interval in the absence of EM. Therefore, there is a need to find the scaled earnings (or scaled earnings 
changes) distribution in the absence of EM.  
 
                                                 
15Note that for skewness measure, a higher rank indicates that the distribution is more negatively skewed.  
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Q. Yu et al, (2006) supposed that, in the absence of EM, earnings are normally distributed. They added that if 
there is neither incentives nor evidence for EM beyond a certain point of the actual earnings distribution, they 
can just truncate the distribution at that point and assume that the truncated part (the distribution right to the 
truncation point) is normally distributed. Then, they can further deduce the mean and variance of the full 
earnings distribution in the absence of EM from the truncated distribution and thus, restore the full distribution. 
 
Q. Yu et al, (2006) assumed that as all listed companies face the same macroeconomic and regulatory 
environment, the earning variability among companies is mainly determined by firm-specific factors. However 
this hypothesis is inappropriate for our Islamic banks sample since they are dispersed in many countries with 
different macroeconomic and regulatory environment. Thus we were not able to assume the normality of our 
sample. Hence, Q. Yu et al, (2006) methodology cannot be applied here.  
 
Moreira and Pope, (2007) proposed another measurement methodology. This methodology is similar to that 
applied by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), and the same happens to the expected number of observations in a 




Following Moreira and Pope (2007), we define Islamic banks’ degree of earning management pervasiveness 
(EMP) as the absolute value of the following quotient: 
 
Where:  
• EQi: the expected number of IBIs in that same interval in the pre-managed earnings 
distribution; 
• AQi : the actual number of IBIs in interval i (i = first interval to the left of zero; first interval to 
the right of zero); 
• EQi = (AQi-1 + AQi+1)/2. 
 
The above method can help us estimate the pervasiveness of EM. By comparing the observed earnings level (or 
earnings change) distribution and the expected earnings level (or earnings change) distribution, we can obtain the 
number of IBIs engaging in EM as a percentage of the banks that should fall just below or above the threshold in 
the absence of EM. While rough, this can offer some indication of the pervasiveness of EM (Q. Yu et al, 2006). 
 
From the differences between the actual and expected earnings levels (or earnings changes) distributions, we 
compute the percentage of banks engaged in EM to be near the zero thresholds. Table.6 reports estimates of the 
degree of pervasiveness for the earnings levels and earnings change analyses. 
[Insert Table.6] 
The former have, for both intervals, a degree of pervasiveness a little higher than 95%. That of earnings changes 
analysis is around 39% for the first interval to the left of zero and 12.5 % to the right of zero. Hence, Islamic 
banks show a higher degree of pervasiveness in avoiding earnings losses than in avoiding earnings decreases. 
This evidence is fully supportive of our first hypothesis and corroborates the conclusions of our previous visual 
findings based on the empirical distributions. 
 
Figures.4A and 4B graphically present the degree of pervasiveness to avoid losses for all distribution, and in 
earnings levels  and earnings changes analysis respectively. 
[Insert Figure.4] 
From these two figures, we can notice that the expected number of Islamic banks falling in the first interval to 
the left of zero should be 23, but the actual number of Islamic banks in the interval is 1. This suggests that an 
excess of 22 banks managed to report their earnings levels in this interval, which is 95.6% of the expected 
number of banks or 3.68% of the whole distribution. Consequently, we can say that EM is pervasive at the zero 
earnings level threshold. For the earnings changes data, the number of banks engaged in EM is 38.5% for the 
zero earnings decrease threshold, which is also quite high. However, the pervasiveness of EM in this case is less 
severe. This finding denotes again that Islamic banks are expected to face a higher incentive to manipulate 
earnings to avoid reporting losses. This graphical evidence adds to that discussed in the previous paragraph and 
is supportive of our findings in the previous section. 
 
The literature does not offer clear evidence to guarantee that this pervasiveness measure is completely 
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uncorrelated with the partition variable (Moreira and Pope, 2007). In fact, if there is any correlation, there would 
be a measurement error (McNichols and Wilson, 1988; Beaver et al., 2003). However, since we use graphical 
and statistical approaches simultaneously, we do not expect our conclusions to be affected by any potential 
measurement error (Moreira and Pope, 2007). Even though our estimation may not be very precise, we do 
believe these estimations offer some useful signs of the possible range of the pervasiveness of EM among IBIs. 
5. Conclusions 
 
Using Jacob and Jorgensen (2005) framework, we investigate several questions related to the debate over 
whether the results in prior studies about discontinuities in earnings and earnings change histograms at earnings 
thresholds are evidence of earnings management in IBIs or whether they are spuriously induced by the research 
design. Using earnings levels as a target variable, we provided graphical and statistical evidences that there is an 
unusually high occurrence of Islamic banks in earnings interval immediately to the right of zero and an unusually 
low occurrence in that to the left for fiscal year and not for the other alternate periods. We take these findings as 
evidence that Islamic banks manage their earnings to avoid losses, in accordance with the earning distribution 
approach. However,  we do not find statistical evidence of EM that might allow for avoiding earnings decreases. 
Such results might be explained on the ground that this because of the distribution of earnings changes is a noisy 
version of the distribution of earnings levels (Beaver et al. 2003). 
 
These results generally validate the Faouzi and Zarai (2012) findings and indicate that their results are not 
spuriously induced by scaling as Degeorge, et al. (1999). and Durtschi and Easton (2005) suggest. They also 
indicate that the Faouzi and Zarai (2012) results, for the most part, cannot be attributed to the asymmetric tax 
treatment of gains and losses. Earnings management appears to be the most likely reason. 
By the same, we try to discriminate between earnings management and ‘settling up’ as the reasons for the lower 
earnings response coefficients (ERCs) of fourth fiscal quarter earnings. Results for the variance are more 
consistent with the EM hypothesis than the settling up hypothesis. The rank of the variance of fiscal year 
earnings is significantly higher than the rank for any of the other three intermediate periods. This result is more 
consistent with EM at the fiscal year-end than with effects induced by fourth quarter earnings being used to 
“settle up” the fiscal year earnings with the sum of the earnings for the previous three quarters. 
Aside from this, Islamic banks are found to have higher degree of EM pervasiveness to avoid losses, consistent 
with a higher incentive to manipulate earnings. Moreover, such an incentive is also affected by the way banks 
approach the zero earnings target. Islamic banks approaching the target from below show higher pervasiveness 
than Islamic banks approaching the target from above. 
In sum, the empirical evidence collected so far fully supports our prior empirical studies. It suggests that Islamic 
banks face a higher incentive to avoid losses than to avoid earnings decreases, and do have a higher degree of 
EM pervasiveness. 
 
This paper benefits from the publication of earlier studies and has attempted to complement them by providing a 
more holistic perspective on EM. However, the main contributions of this thesis are: 
• Using different empirical methodologies, we have provided some empirical evidences of EM in IBIs, 
most of them related to earnings losses avoidance motivations. As far as we know, this is the first study 
that demonstrates this fact, using Jacob and Jorgensen (2005) approach.  
• It adds to the literature that supports the discontinuities in the earnings distribution as being determined 
(at least partially) by EM. It extends the methodology introduced in Jacob and Jorgensen (2005) and 
used it to examine the EM behaviour across sets of entities with different features and incentives. At a 
time when Islamic banks’ EM behaviour is still a “black box”, this can be a significant contribution.  
• Paper results have implications for investors and financial analysts. They suggest that investors and 
analysts can use quarterly data to unravel part of managers’ earnings management decisions by 
choosing to analyze Islamic bank performance reported on a different annual basis than the one reported 
in the annual financial statements.  
As this is the case in all empirical studies, the data used have a compromise between the ideal and the feasible. 
Our study is not an exception of this criterion. Thus, this research did not exceed certain limitations namely: 
• The study does not provide us with sufficient understandings of the extent and the scope of EM in the 
Islamic banking industry16. Furthermore, it is worth noting that sometimes banks might choose not to 
meet the zero earning thresholds. Instead they would take larger losses in the current period and 
                                                 
16The disadvantages of the distribution approach, as pointed out by Healy and Wahlen (1999) and Q. Yu et al, (2006), are that it captures neither the magnitude of earnings management nor 
the specific methods by which earnings are managed.  
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accumulate some earnings for the subsequent period17. If this happens, the earnings will not show up 
near the threshold and using the reported earnings distribution to uncover earnings may not identify 
such practice (Faouzi and Zarai, 2012). Therefore, several directions can be taken in future research in 
order to detect any EM practices and to measure the frequency and magnitude of EM in the Islamic 
banks. 
• The analysis based on unbalanced panel data suffers from efficiency problem, which may need 
additional rectifications to produce efficient estimation results. Moreover, the limited number of 
observations for some of our studies variables may compromise the properties of the methods that we 
used. If the period was long enough, it was possible in these conditions to make periods under analysis 
and to track modifications in terms of proprieties ... etc. 
• The analysis fails to study cross-country heterogeneity and still suffers from omitted variable bias. 
Furthermore, our model used to estimate EM might not efficiently capture all the characteristic 
necessary to a good estimation.  
• Employing an eventual survey among Islamic banking industry experts could provide additional 
interpretations that enhance the suggested proposals and helps discerning the difference between 
Islamic and conventional banks in terms of manipulating techniques and consequences. 
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Table.1: Standardized Differences for Quarterly Earnings Analysis 
 
Table.2: Standardized Differences for Quarterly Earnings Changes Analysis 
 
 









Standardized difference right of 0 2.286 2.54 2.892 2.713 
Standardized difference left of 0 0.115 -1.569 -2.826 -6.335 
 Period Ending in Quarter 
 One Two Three Four 
Standardized difference right of 0 2.645 1.747 2.403 0.280 
Standardized difference left of 0 0.752 -0.954 -0.257 -0.935 
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Table.3. Standardized differences in pre-tax earnings analysis 
 Values for tested intervals Values for standardized differences in intervals 
 Standardized 
difference 










































Table.4: Moments Behaviour According to Settling up and EM Hypotheses 
 
















Variance - - Highest Lowest Lowest - - Highest 
Skewness Lowest Highest - - Highest - - Lowest 
Kurtosis - Lowest - Highest - Lowest - Highest 
 
Table.5. Moments of Net Distributable Profits 
 
 Period Ending in Quarter 
 One Two Three Four 
Variance 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.011 
Skewness -2.790 2.385 -0.369 -0.253 
Kurtosis 17.607 10.962 6,058 2.911 
 
Table.6. Degree of EM pervasiveness 
 
 Discontinuity to the… 









Number of actual banks: (AQi) 1 4 37 9 
Number of expected banks: (EQi) 23 7 19 8 
Pervasiveness: (EMP =  │(EQi - AQi)/ EQi│) 0.956 0.385 0.947 0.125 
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Figure.1.D: Q3 Scaled Earnings Distribution
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Figure.2.D: Q3 Scaled Earnings Changes Distribution
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